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 This paper offers an account of the possibility for 
a system of normative ethics in a later Wittgensteinean 
epistemological context. By adopting a viewpoint of ethics as 
fundamentally grounded in ‘practical identities’ as the source 
of normative obligations in a manner expressed by thinkers 
such as Christine Korsgaard, the paper attempts to clarify and 
surpass the quietist and unanalyzable ethical account given 
by Wittgenstein himself. Such an approach based on identity 
largely mirrors the normative possibilities in speech offered 
by ‘forms of life’ in Philosophical Investigations by offering 
in-context, normatively rich frameworks in which ethical 
statements can be adequately and normatively assessed. 
Such a viewpoint accounts for the accepted disagreement in 
Wittgenstein’s ethical thoughts by showing the in-context, 
identity-based ‘form of life’ differences that lead to acceptable 
ethical divergence, while also opening up room for semi-
universal bedrock ethical statements that all humans in a 
given social community necessarily are subject to due to 
the basic identities implied in being a human being for their 
community. Such an account introduces more clarity to the way 
that ethical deliberation and disagreement takes shape from a 
Wittgensteinian perspective.
Introduction
 In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein destroys the 
determinacy of meaning in language that was and seemingly 
still is taken as a given by most people when thinking 
philosophically, creating a great skeptical problem for anyone 
wanting to adequately communicate with those around them.  
Luckily for anyone who wants to use language, Wittgenstein 
believes that there is a social solution to this problem and 
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seems to claim that normative standards for meaning in 
language do exist. There are various interpretations of exactly 
what Wittgenstein’s solution involves, but at its base it goes 
something like this: “Although there may not be a deeply 
philosophically analyzable absolute meaning of any given 
sentence, when used in practice by members of a shared social 
community, the terms gain normative meaning.”  Thus, the 
members of a community can communicate with each-other, 
and in those contexts, there are normative standards of correct 
and incorrect usages of language.
 Although Wittgenstein believed in limited normativity 
in the meaning of language, he never gave a clear account 
of his ethical beliefs and specifically opposed any attempts 
to create systems of ethics. Creating a system of ethics 
seems to be an attempt to apply a rigid, constricting lens 
onto a linguistic landscape incapable of handling such 
rigidity. Thus, Wittgenstein only ever comments on ethics 
as being an extremely personal subject, and a subject about 
which great variation is to be accepted. As Anne-Marie 
Christensen describes it, to Wittgenstein, a person’s “ethical 
attitude” is “a form of personal worldview.” These personal 
ethical worldviews may differ, and they may even differ 
fundamentally. If they do differ, there is no sure way to resolve 
the difference, as there is no shared standard to which they can 
appeal; it is simply a clash between worldviews. 
 This account of moral disagreement leaves 
Wittgenstein’s account of ethical disagreement in a position 
somewhat similar to his account of the interactions between 
separate linguistic communities. To Wittgenstein, determinacy 
in language use only exists within the bounds of a specific 
community. Thus, the way in which what is true and untrue 
about the world is decided necessarily resides within 
communities as well. There is no external measure to appeal 
to. Nevertheless, when two linguistic communities meet, it 
is possible that one community might critique the beliefs of 
the other as inaccurate. It is even possible that a group would 
internally critique itself, as has happened numerous times 
in scientific and cultural revolutions. In these revolutions, 
core assumptions about the way that things work have been 
challenged and flipped on their heads. It seems that ethical 
disagreement between two individuals for Wittgenstein lies in a 
similar position. The disagreeing people simply have disparate 
worldviews. 
 From these disparate worldviews, meaningful 
Practical Identity and Forms of Life
49
EPISTEME XXXII 
critique can happen. Wittgenstein even gives examples of 
such discussions in an ethical context.  That said, how such 
meaningful critique is resolved goes unanswered, despite the 
fact that it does, in fact, often resolve itself. There is nothing 
in Wittgenstein’s philosophical arsenal (ethical or linguistic) 
that can help us understand what might happen when two 
members of separate linguistic communities or two people 
with different ethical worldviews interact. There is no separate, 
crystalline fact of the matter that they could appeal to in order 
to resolve their disagreement. This lack is already worrying 
to what we intuitively feel should be the case in interactions 
between communities about scientific matters of fact, but in the 
ethical scenario between two members of the same community 
such a conclusion feels almost unacceptable. To have ethical 
disagreement between two very close people shrouded in 
such epistemic fog seems like it might be giving up more than 
is needed and obscuring what is a coherent, if a bit difficult, 
process for those involved.
 In this paper, I will present a potential solution to this 
problem. This solution will build a conception of moral decision 
making using the concept of ‘practical identity’ provided by 
Christine Korsgaard as an analogue to Wittgenstein’s forms of 
life which he employs to understand normativity in general uses 
of language. Such an approach might help in resolving some of 
Wittgenstein’s ethical indeterminacy. Additionally, it will give a 
useful analytic lens to understand both personal moral conflicts 
and ethical disagreement. Using this lens, moral deliberation 
and disagreement is revealed as not a vague interaction of 
viewpoints clashing with each other that mysteriously and 
inexplicably resolves itself, but rather a negotiation of identities 
for the person/s involved.
Practical Identity
 At the core of Korsgaard’s ethical theory is the claim 
that all obligations are fundamentally a response to a threat 
against one or more of our identities. These identities are what 
Korsgaard calls “practical identities,” meaning that they aren’t 
based on some deep metaphysical claim of identity as a thing 
existing from a third person perspective and informed by the 
Scientific World View, but rather a practical account of the way 
that we experience deliberation from a first person perspective. 
Regardless and independent of the existence or nonexistence 
from a third-person perspective of some idealized Cartesian 
self, the reality of our lived first person decision-making process 
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is that “it is as if there were something over and above all of 
your desires, something that is you, and that [deliberates and] 
chooses which [desire] to act on.” It is this non-metaphysical, 
practical you that makes up your overarching practical identity 
as a person.
 Such an approach of establishing practical identities 
may seem like it does not mesh well with a Wittgensteinian 
account of things. It may seem like it relies too much on some 
a priori method of speculative reasoning that fails the test of 
the private language argument (which I will explain shortly) 
for lacking a criterion of correctness. This, however, is not 
the case. In this argument, it seems to me that Korsgaard is 
actually making a somewhat Wittgensteinian argument against 
the classical Cartesian view of the self while simultaneously 
maintaining the the deliberative agent self as a practically, 
although not necessarily metaphysically, existent identity. 
 Obviously, the classical Cartesian view of the self is 
flawed from a Wittgensteinian perspective; it posits a dualist 
account of the world that quite blatantly assumes the existence 
of a deeply and inherently private view of a self fundamentally 
inaccessible to others. This conception fails the test presented 
by Wittgenstein’s private language argument. According 
to the private language argument, this self could not really 
communicate with itself in such a private way, as would be no 
external criterion of correctness it can appeal to. To illustrate 
this, look at what we might normally do to see whether we’re 
right or not. Say I want to know what the date is. Since we 
are currently in a 2020 COVID world and the days all blend 
together, I’m not 100% sure if my disposition to guess that 
it’s December 19th is correct, so I decide to check the calendar 
on my phone. After checking the calendar, I realize that I 
am wrong. It is, in fact, December 20th. I needed an external 
criterion of correctness to compare my internal disposition 
to, or else I wouldn’t really know what was right. From this 
base, Wittgenstein argues that such a private definition cannot 
function. All that such a private definition could possibly 
give would be a measure of whether the person who gave 
the definition feels that they are using the term properly. That 
isn’t much of a standard for truth at all; it’s not verifiable. All 
real truth claims require an outside criterion of correctness 
with which they can check. Thus, the metaphysically dualist 
Cartesian account of selfhood is doomed to fail should we 
accept Wittgenstein’s critique of private languages.
 In contrast, Korsgaard’s account treats our decision 
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making process as a fundamentally public and practical 
matter. Korsgaard points out that we do, in fact, experience 
a deliberative process as agents, one that is unified by our 
identity and fundamentally relies on language as a tool for 
representing our reasons. We do, in fact, order, encourage, 
blame, obey, and punish ourselves, as Wittgenstein points 
out. Our inner monologue is not simply real: it is also public. 
If we were to share the language that we use with ourselves 
in our deliberative process with others, they would be able 
to understand it. Such a process is not a private one in the 
sense of a private language, but merely in the sense that it is 
a negotiation between parts of ourselves. We may or may not 
choose to share this process with other people, but it happens 
nonetheless using a publicly available language and employs 
publicly shareable reasons. To deny that this account of identity 
and agency is resting on an inherently public base would be 
to deny that the reasons we use to justify our decisions are 
public as well, which is blatantly false when further considered. 
The deliberative process is inherently one of negotiation with 
ourselves, and we can all explain our reasons as to why we 
make the decisions we deliberated over. The results of this 
personal deliberation provides us with reasons that we can and 
do regularly share. I can explain my reasoning for a decision I 
make to anyone, and although they might not agree with me, 
we can certainly expect that they will understand me.
Identities of Obligation
 In addition to having a single overarching practical 
identity as a given individual, each individual also has many 
smaller identities. Contingent practical identities such as ‘sister,’ 
‘doctor,’ or ‘Austrian citizen’ each come with their own socially-
determined reasons to do certain things and not do others. 
A good doctor ought to spend time developing their medical 
knowledge and ought not to harm their patient, for example. 
 Everyone also necessarily shares their identity as 
deliberative and social beings who need the social context 
provided by their contingent identities to motivate their 
decisions and live a meaningful life. In our specific case, this 
identity can be referred to as our human identity. This human 
identity, being the base upon which our other identities stand, 
also provides normative force to our other, contingent identities. 
Additionally, it can not be given up without dire consequences, 
as to give it up would be to give up our capability for identity 
and thus deprive us of our reasons for action. This is why 
we might say that someone “lost themselves” in rage if they 
kill someone in a murder of passion; they have temporarily 
snapped out of their identity as human. Other identities can 
also approach a similar level of importance in our lives when 
we become very attached to them. Someone might choose to 
die rather than betray their country’s interests because to do 
so would be to forsake a national identity that they’ve made 
so core to their being that dying is preferable to betraying 
it. Ethical decision-making then involves the deliberative 
negotiation between our identities and the situations and 
urges we face in living our lives. For example, a man might 
face a conflict of identity when his family refuses to invite his 
boyfriend to a family gathering due to their bigoted beliefs 
around sexuality. In this situation, the man must decide 
between an obligation from his identity as a member of his 
family and an obligation from his identity as a lover and a gay 
man (among others). 
 If someone makes decisions that clash with one of their 
identities, then that identity is threatened. If they either make 
enough decisions against that identity, or a decision that directly 
rules out that identity, then they lose the identity completely. 
For an example of losing the identity through making enough 
decisions against it, imagine someone who identifies as a 
tea enthusiast. If that person suddenly starts choosing coffee 
over tea every morning for a week, then their identity as a tea 
enthusiast is threatened, and they and the people around them 
might start questioning it. “Hey,” a friend might say, “Why did 
you stop drinking tea all of the sudden? You drank it every 
morning before last week!” If such behavior continues for six 
months, then calling that person a tea enthusiast seems to no 
longer be applicable, and a friend might call them out on it if 
they still insist that they are. “I haven’t seen you drink tea in 
half a year with no good excuse! How can you still claim to be a 
tea enthusiast!” An example of a decision that instantly destroys 
an identity might be one of someone identifying as a member 
of their school’s board game club. If they quit the club, then that 
identity is instantly destroyed. In almost all cases, it would be 
incorrect to continue claiming that you’re a part of board game 
club if you’ve formally quit, and the people around them could 
also call them out on that. “Stop saying you’re a part of the 
board game club! You told everyone you quit!”
 As you can see by these examples, identities are 
fundamentally public entities. In the social contexts where 
a given set of identities is used, they have their meaning by 
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dint of the standards set within that social context, and there 
are normative standards one must achieve in order to claim 
membership in those identity groups. In a society without 
music, you cannot identify as a musician. Similarly, the honor 
code of a knight during the Middle Ages will be different than 
the honor code of a baseball player in our modern day, even 
though they would likely both identify as honorable. The 
existence of these identities is determined by the shared social 
world in which they’re used. The contents of these identities 
(i.e. the reasons and obligations they give you), as well as the 
criterion under which you can claim ownership to them is 
mediated through this inherently public social lens as well.
 Korsgaard employs this account of practical identity 
to offer a compelling Kantian account of what such decision-
making necessarily looks like. That said, Korsgaard employs 
many claims that a Wittgensteinian perspective might reject in 
constructing her account of morality building off of this base. 
Regardless, the starting point of practical identity itself is really 
what has important implications for pulling back a bit at some 
of the vagueness present in Wittgenstein’s account of morality. 
Non-Kantian approaches could certainly be built from the base 
of obligation that the conception of practical identity provides.
Identities and Forms of Life
 One of the terms often discussed in explanations of 
Wittgenstein’s conception of linguistic normativity is the 
term Lebensform, or “form of life.” Although Wittgenstein 
himself doesn’t use the term to any truly great extent, it is an 
illuminating term for understanding the type of scenarios in 
which a language has normative meaning. To Wittgenstein, 
language only gains normative meaning within a given 
embodied context. Here’s how I like to think of it: language 
cannot be understood in isolation, but requires two levels 
of context. The first context is a social one. You must be 
indoctrinated into a community that speaks a shared language 
in shared contexts before you can adequately understand the 
language in use. The second context is a teleological one. You 
must employ the language in a specific context of use before 
it can be adequately understood. Both of these contexts are 
intertwined, with no hard barrier between them. You cannot 
understand any given use of language without both.
 An example of a form of life can be seen in the 
institution of a grocery store and the many activities that you 
engage in within it. For example, imagine a woman bringing 
her big cart of items to the checkout lane. In the cart, she has 
oats from the bulk section, some produce, and tofu. She begins 
placing her items on the conveyor belt, and eventually the 
cashier gets to her oats and asks her “What’s the code for that?” 
The woman replies “GE30.” This situation requires both that 
the woman buying groceries and the cashier have the cultural 
knowledge of how supermarkets work, the process of checking 
out, and the special process of exchanging codes for items from 
the bulk section in order to understand how the language is to 
be used in that specific situation. In a different situation with 
different context, such language would have absolutely no 
meaning, or a completely different one. Asking “What’s the 
code for that?” has completely different meaning as a software 
programmer, or a spy learning how to communicate using 
a cypher. Without knowing the specific context, you cannot 
understand the specific utterances and follow the language 
game properly. These cultural and teleological contexts are 
what make up forms of life.
 Wittgenstein’s example of a language game between two 
builders in section two of Philosophical Investigations can also 
be analyzed from this form of life perspective. In the example, 
two people are conversing in a very simple language consisting 
solely of words of construction materials, such as ‘slab.’ One 
builder will yell ‘slab!’ at the other, and the other builder will go 
and fetch them a slab. The language of Wittgenstein’s builders 
from section two has meaning in part because they’re using it in 
the context of a specific activity. That said, if you take one of the 
builders out and replace them with someone without the social 
conditioning and training to be a member of their construction-
worker community, they won’t have the social context to know 
what’s going on and understand the teleological context they’ve 
been placed in. If you lack a part of the context required to 
participate in the form of life that a language is being used in, 
then you won’t be able to adequately understand the use of 
language you’re engaging in. For Wittgenstein, language is to 
be understood in use.
 In the case of the builders, the fact that they live in a 
form of life as members in a construction-worker community 
seems to express nearly the same meaning as saying that 
they are construction workers. It is their entrance into that 
community that allows them to identify as construction 
workers, and people who can properly assert that they hold the 
identity of construction worker can reasonably be expected to 
understand the language games that construction workers play. 
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Identity, in the sense of practical identity as given by Korsgaard, 
seems to bear resemblance to the concept of a form of life. Our 
practical identities give us structure around which we can 
shape the contours of our life, they give us reasons to make 
both mundane and profound decisions in our life, and they 
give us boundaries within which we must mostly abide unless 
we want to feel the guilt of losing our sense of self. They give 
us teleological reasons that we should strive for and a social 
context in which we live. In a quite real sense, our identities 
express the literal form that our life takes.
Ethical Theories
 As forms of life give normativity to language, so too 
can identities give normativity to ethical expression and 
ethical language. Although such a conception of identity as 
the normative scope through which we can evaluate language 
would necessarily seem to create a theory of ethics, something 
Wittgenstein was quite blatantly against, the rigidity of 
the system springing from this theory is not extreme. In 
many cases, the account offered by Wittgenstein of differing 
worldviews does not greatly differ from such an identity-based 
account. That said, the lens of identity can offer more clarity to 
the situation.
 To illuminate this, let’s take a look at an example used 
by Christensen in her account of Wittgenstein’s ethics taken 
from a conversation between Wittgenstein and Rush Rhees. In 
their conversation, Wittgenstein and Rhees discuss “a man ‘who 
has come to the conclusion that he must either leave his wife 
or abandon his work within cancer research.’” Wittgenstein 
responds: “[s]uppose I am his friend, and I say to him ‘look, 
you’ve taken this girl out of her home, and now, by God, you 
must stick to her.’ This would be called taking up an ethical 
attitude.”  He also notes that the man might respond “but what 
of suffering humanity? how [sic] can I abandon my research?” 
Wittgenstein even notes that the man might consider his wife 
“’It probably won’t be fatal for her. She’ll get over it, probably 
marry again,’ and so on.” All of these are referring to different 
‘ethical attitudes’ that the man could take up in defending his 
actions, and Wittgenstein is okay with that. 
 All of these ‘ethical attitudes’ are just as easily expressed 
in terms of identity. In the first case, Wittgenstein is appealing 
to the man’s identity as a husband and the duties that come 
with marriage. In the second case, the man is responding with 
the reasons given to him by his identity as a cancer scientist and 
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someone whose work brings good into the world. In the final 
case, the man is qualifying the harm done to his wife by arguing 
that she can handle the destruction of her identity as his wife. 
To Wittgenstein, all of these responses are theoretically valid, 
and under an identity-based system they are as well. As we can 
see here, although a practical-identity based theory of ethics is 
certainly a theory, its system need not be excessively rigid in its 
reach. Each of these identities place valid claims on the scientist 
in question. The ‘theory’ I offer in this paper is really more a 
method to add more clarity to the nature of Wittgensteinian 
ethics than any substantive change in the contents of it. 
 Nonetheless, there are places where a practical-identity 
based system of ethics does impose seemingly universal rules 
upon us, and those cases come into play when our identity as 
human is threatened by an action that we might take. To give 
up our identity as human would be to give up our very nature 
as a social, deliberative animal in need of having socially-
defined identities which obligate and motivate us. To give up 
our human identity would be to give up the base groundwork 
that enables us to exist and be ethical creatures in the first place. 
It is thus impossible to give up our human identity without 
in some moral way dying and losing our membership in our 
community. The standards set by this identity as human are 
the ethical standards accepted as so right that to question them 
would be crazy, and to act against them would be to commit an 
‘inhuman’ deed.
Non-negotiable Obligation
 One example of such a non-negotiable, ‘human’ 
obligation would Korsgaard’s account of a conflict between 
one’s identity as a solider and their identity as human. While a 
good soldier should follow the orders of their superiors, a good 
human should not murder the innocent. In such a situation, the 
identity of humanity overrides any contingent identity, as to 
lose it would be to lose the self. 
 The identity as human could be considered as giving 
us a group of unquestionable, certain statements from a 
Wittgensteinean point of view presented in On Certainty. Such 
certain statements are basic assumptions that we act on in 
normal life, and it does not make sense to doubt them in almost 
all contexts. The identity of human comprises obligations so 
basic and fundamental to our conceptions of morality that they 
are unquestioned for most people outside of truly exceptional 
circumstances. For example, behaviors like killing another 
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human being for fun or causing completely arbitrary harm to a 
person can be quite simply taken as bedrock immoral actions in 
our society. These statements could be questioned theoretically, 
but practically are taken as a given. In the process of ethical 
deliberation with someone who tried to question one of  these 
bedrock statements of ethical life, many would simply dismiss 
them as insane.
 Imagine, for example, two people entering an ethical 
debate about the permissibility of some hotly debated topic, 
say the practice of eating meat. Perhaps the argument of the 
person insisting that people should not eat meat may take 
Peter Singer’s perspective and explain that animals are sentient 
beings just like us who can experience pain just like we do, 
and that we have no good reasons to inflict such pain on those 
other animals. From an identity perspective, this could be seen 
as appealing to our identity as a sentient being who also avoids 
pain. If their interlocutor were to simply respond “Well, I don’t 
see anything wrong with causing pain to other human people 
anyways, why should I care about animals’ pain?”, then the 
conversation would be brought to a standstill. Their argument 
is inhuman. It is making a claim so contrary to the base moral 
assumptions that we share that it becomes almost impossible 
to engage with them. In these situations, what they’re saying 
is just so absurd that to argue with it no longer makes sense. 
They seem to not be a member of our linguistic and ethical 
community. When these statements are questioned, we may 
have exhausted our justifications and ‘reached bedrock with our 
spades turned.’ Perhaps the only answer here is to say “That 
claim is simply wrong.”
The Limitations of This View
 When I originally set out to write this article, I had much 
more lofty goals. I wanted to introduce universally normative 
statements within Wittgenstein’s epistemic framework. 
Unfortunately, such a goal has proven to be untenable. It 
seems impossible to push the inherently limited epistemic 
framework adopted by Wittgenstein to accept any standard 
of truth that would extend beyond the reach of one language-
using community. Such a conclusion is certainly painful for 
anyone aspiring to universal truth in ethics, especially given 
how persuasive Wittgenstein’s argumentation is. That said, if 
such a viewpoint is all that a careful and honest analysis of the 
epistemic situation allows, then we are obligated to adopt it.
 The largest reason that I am quite unhappy with this 
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result is that it maintains the weirdness that is inherent in 
Wittgenstein’s epistemic system. How are we to adequately 
account for what happens when two completely separate 
language-using communities meet with each other? The 
communities have totally separate normative standards of 
truth, yet supposedly something will happen in their interaction, 
and one view will come out on top. It seems that here we are 
necessarily forced into one of two directions. The first possible 
route would be to accept that all truth standards are equally 
good, and that in such scenarios each community is equally 
right. This would be taking a relativist perspective. The second 
option would be to reject the very idea of truth in an absolute 
sense, claiming that from an outside perspective, to say that 
either community is really right would simply be a misuse of 
language. There is no criterion of correctness to be had from 
this outside perspective. This seems to be this position that 
Wittgenstein takes, rather than the relativist one. Such an 
account represents the destruction of the ‘capital T’ Truth. At 
the very least, it is a claim that argument about such a truth is 
altogether impossible (how one could adequately argue for the 
existence of such a truth from this framework is beyond me). 
Such a conclusion is deeply disappointing, especially in the 
context of ethics, where it seems to take some of the weight out 
of an area of life which you are expected to make significant 
sacrifices for.
Conclusion
 Limitations in mind, the framework expressed in 
this paper does accomplish a somewhat significant step in 
improving the tools of analysis that we have when discussing 
ethical disagreement from a Wittgensteinian epistemic 
perspective. Under Wittgenstein’s perspective, differences in 
worldview are just that: not analyzable in a systematic way and 
philosophically non-navigable. By offering an account of how 
practical identities are meaningfully similar in (giving context 
to moral obligation) to the way that forms of life give context 
to other linguistic expressions, I have enabled a somewhat 
comparable level of analysis of ethical statements to other 
linguistic contexts under a Wittgensteinian framework.
 The account offered here is certainly not a complete 
one. It still has a few rough edges. Specifically, I think that there 
is still room to improve the account of obligation from our 
identity as human that is offered in this paper. The claim that 
our identity as human is in some way basic makes sense even 
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within a Wittgensteinian framework. To call some person or 
action inhuman seems to be about the strongest ethical critique 
we have available. That said, the claims about our human 
identity being the base upon which all other identities build 
and the idea of what is essentially a human ‘species being’ as a 
social creature in need of identity are perhaps a bit out of place 
in a Wittgensteinian system. This is despite the fact that ethical 
bedrock claims do undoubtedly exist. Perhaps the structure 
they have been fit in within this paper is simply a bit too rigid.
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